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The concept of experiential learning and John
Dewey’ s theory of re¯ ective thought and action
REIJO MIETTINEN
University of Helsinki, Finland
The conception of experiential learning is an established approach in the tradition of adult
education theory. David Kolb’ s four-stage model of experiential learning is a fundamental
presentation of the approach. In his work ExperientialLearning, Kolb states that JohnDewey, Kurt
Lewin and Jean Piaget are the founders of the approach. The article discusses Kolb’ s eclectic
method of constructing his model of experiential learning. It studies how Kolb introduces and
uses the Lewinian tradition of action research and the work of John Dewey to substantiate his
model. It is concluded that Kolb generalizes a historically very speci® c and unilateral mode of
experience ± feedback session in T-group training ± into a general model of learning. Kolb’ s
interpretation of John Dewey’ s ideas is compared to Dewey’ s concepts of re¯ ective thought and
action. It is concluded that Kolb gives an inadequate interpretation of Dewey’ s thought and that
the very concept of immediate, concrete experience proposed by the experiential learning
approach is epistemologically problematic. The theory historical approach of the article discusses
both substantialquestions related to experiential learning and theway concepts are appropriated,
developed and used within adult education theory.
Introduction
Experiential learning is an important approach within the theoretical tradition of adult
education in Europe, North America and Australia (see e.g. Boud et al. 1985; Boud and
Miller 1996; Weil and McGill 1989). The approach, or movement, has a special nature
as a cognitive enterprise and it can also be seen as a kind of ideology needed to confront
the diverse challenges of adult education. Its theoretical frame has diverse sources of
inspiration: the T-group movement, the learning style technology, humanistic
psychology and critical social theory. It has been in¯ uential in the literature of
management training as well as adult education per se. Without doubt, the two concepts
that characterize the approach most clearly are experience and re¯ ection.
In this paper, I shall evaluate the concept of experience, primarily from an
epistemological point of view, that is, as a representation of learning and the process of
gaining new knowledge. I will argue that in the light of the philosophical studies on the
ways of gaining new knowledge of the world, the model of experiential learning is
inadequate. Through its humanistic connection, the concept of experience also has an
ideological function: faith in an individual’ s innate capacity to grow and learn. This is
whatmakes it particularly attractive for adult education theorists and for the idea of life-
long learning. The humanistic connection is also epistemologically signi® cant, since it
strengthens themethodological individualismof experiential learning. To fully evaluate
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the legacy of the experiential learning approach, the concept of re¯ ection and its roots
in critical theory should also be analysed. In this paper, I shall focus on the concept of
experience. These two concepts are, however, interrelated. It is experience that is
re¯ ected. If the conception of experience is problematic, so is the possibility of its
re¯ ection.
David Kolb’ s book Experiential Learning (1984) is perhaps the best known
presentation of the approach. Kolb’ s four-stage model of learning elaborated in the
book is regarded as classical and as a foundation for experiential learning. It is used
routinely as a source in the literature of the ® eld and in the theses of adult education
students. It has been an important starting point for several attempts to develop adult
education theory (Jarvis 1987; Weil andMcGill 1989). It has been used as a foundation
for formulating a theory of organizational learning (Dixon 1994). It also has been
widely used in management consultation, leadership training and in research on
cognitive processing styles. There are, therefore, good grounds for studying carefully the
theoretical foundations of Kolb’ s work. That will help in a more general way regarding
some of the basic tenets of experiential learning.
Within the scope of an article, it is impossible to discuss all the various themes and
concepts presented by Kolb in his book. Therefore, I shall follow the following
procedure. First, I shall discussKolb’ s method of constructingthemodel. Second, I shall
study how Kolb derives his model, which he claims to a Lewinian model, from the
tradition of Lewinian action research and small group research. Third, I will study how
Kolb introduces and uses the work of John Dewey to substantiate his own model. I
compare this interpretation to the recent interpretations of Dewey specialists in
philosophy concerning Dewey’ s concept of experience and re¯ ective thought (e.g.
Burke 1994; Campbell 1995; Welschman 1995) and to the idea based on my own
reading of Dewey’ s theory. This critical method will elucidate both the substantial
questions related to experiential learning and the way Kolb uses historical sources in his
book. In more general terms, it also deals with the problem of how concepts are
appropriated, developed and used within adult education theory.
Kolb’ s eclectic method and its consequences
Evaluation of Kolb’ s model and book is a problematic task. The book represents a
special genre of writing, which could be characterized as consultancy literature. It was
originally formulated to state arguments for the utilityof the sociotechnologypreviously
developed by the author in the 1960s : the Learning Style Inventory (LSI). The ® rst
version of the model was presented to substantiate the use of the inventory in a book of
exercises in Organizational Psychology (Kolb et al. 1971: 28). The main application of the
model was to manage and gain control of individual learning by inventing one’ s
learning style (Kolb 1976a, 1976b). By recognizing her or his own learning style pro® le
and goals, an individual is meant ` to choose which set of learning abilities he will bring
to bear in any speci® c learning situation ’ . In Experiential Learning (1984) Kolb tries to
elaborate further both the foundations of the model and the extended societal
application of the Learning Style Inventory. Because the author is the developer of this
technology, the book can also be seen as a marketing promotion.
The social technological and practical background is re¯ ected in the way theorizing
proceeds in the book. The substantiation of the model combines widely diÚ erent
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ingredients : ideas, terms and conceptions from many sources. The concepts are de® ned
brie¯ y and without adequate reference to the background literature. As a result, these
concepts often remain unclear and open to many interpretations. On the other hand,
the book has a programmatic nature. It claims to present solutions to many burning
problems of adult education and working life in western, postmodern society.
Kolb starts his book by de® ning the historical roots of experiential learning.
According to him, the founding fathers and developers of the conceptions are John
Dewey, Kurt Lewin and Jean Piaget. Kolb presents in a graphical form the conceptions
of learning of these three theoreticians (Kolb 1984: 22, 24, 25). After presenting the
three founding fathers, Kolb states that the approach was further developed by
therapeutic psychologies based on psychoanalysi s (Carl Jung, Erik Erikson) and
humanistic psychology (Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow) as well as by radical
educationists such as Paulo Freire and Ivan Illich. He also utilizes the results of
neurophysiology which report the functional diÚ erences between the right and left
hemispheres of the human cortex and to the theory of world models presented by the
American philosopher Stephen Pepper. He further indicates (1984 : 17) that techniques
and methods such as those employed in T-groups and action research have contributed
to the conception of experiential learning. Kolb says that he does not want to develop
an alternative theory of learning, ` but rather to suggest through experiential learning
theory a holistic integrative perspective on learning that combines experience,
perception, cognition, and behavior ’ (1984 : 21).
This procedure and method can be called eclectic. Kolb unites terms and concepts,
extracting them from their idea-historical contexts and purposes and puts them to serve
the motives of his own presentation. As a result, theoreticians with quite diÚ erent
backgrounds, motives and incompatible conceptions can be used as founders and
` supporters ’ of experiential learning. This happens when Kolb lumps together Carl
Jung, Kurt Lewin and John Dewey with humanistic psychologists, as founders and
developers of experiential learning. One cannot help concluding that Kolb’ s motive is
not critical evaluation or interdisciplinarity but an attempt to construct an ` attractive ’
collection of ideas that can be advocated as a solution to the social problems of our time
and to substantiate the usefulness of his learning style inventory.
Kolb uses in the development of his conception the theory of world hypotheses of the
American philosopherStephenPepper. In his theory Pepper suggests that there are four
basically diÚ erent hypotheses of world, four ways of conceptualizing the reality :
formism, mechanism, contextualism and organism (Pepper 1972). Kolb fuses these
hypotheses to his model and combines themwith those ® ndings of brain physiology that
indicate functional diÚ erences between the right and the left hemispheres of the human
cortex. Broad historical ways of conceptualizing the world, that is, a history of ideas, is
combined with the physiology of the nervous system. Pepper rejects such a mixing of
ingredients. Two central principles of his method are ` Eclecticism is confusing ’
(104± 114) and ` Concepts which have lost their contact to their root metaphors are
empty abstractions ’ (113± 114).
Pepper evaluates the possibilities of the eclectic method as follows (1972: 106):
It is a tempting notion, that perhaps a world theory more adequate than any
other ¼ might be developed through the selection of what is best in each of them
and organizing the results with a synthesis set of categories ¼ . It is the eclectic
method.Our contention is, that thismethod ismistaken in principle in that it adds
no factual content and confuses the structures of fact which are clearly spread out
the concept of experiential learning 57
in the pure root-metaphor theories; in two words, that is almost inevitably sterile
and confusing.
Pepper argues that the concepts ± when taken out of their theoretical context, the
context where they come from ± change into ` thin, littlemore than names with a cosmic
glow about them ’ (1972: 113). The concepts and terms outside their theoretical context
do not have intrinsic or ultimate value in themselves. It is a paradox that Kolb uses
Pepper’ s basic metaphors exactly in a way that is contrary to Pepper’ s methodology, by
taking them out of their context and by fusing them as auxiliary terms into his ` holistic,
integrative perspective ’ . Kolb does not use Pepper’ s root metaphors to analyse the
background presuppositions of his own synthesis.
The background of Kolb’ s concept of experience: the four steps
Kolb’ s theory is best known through the four-stagemodel of experiential learning (Kolb
et al. 1971: 28, see ® gure 1). In 1976, he calls it ` the Lewinian Experiential Learning
Figure 1. The Lewinian experiential learning model according to Kolb (1984 : 21).
Model ’ and ` The Lewinianmodel of Action Research and Laboratory Training ’ (Kolb
1984: 21). This model is generally known as Kolb’ s model, and Kolb constructs his own
theory with it as a starting point.
It is misleading, however, to call this model a Lewinian model. In his presentation
Kolb does not refer to Lewin. Instead he uses, as his source, a report written by Ronald
Lippit on the well known training and development enterprise organized by Lewin and
his colleagues, in 1946, in theResearchCenter forGroupDynamics in theMassachusett s
Institute of Technology (MIT). The theme and substance of the training intervention
comprised an analysis and solution of the racial prejudices and con¯ icts in the State of
Connecticut. Lippit’ s book (1949) is one of the ® nest and most careful reports ever
written about an educational enterprise oriented to eÚ ect a change in the community
life. However, Kolb uses it very selectively. He picks up from the variety of content and
methods of the seminar only one aspect: direct feedback related to the group dynamics
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after the group sessions. The recollections of the participants in the feedback situation
can be regarded as a ` here and now experience ’ to be analysed. It was these feedback
sessions that, later on, developed into the heart of the laboratory and T-group training
movement. It is this speci® c aspect of the seminar that Kolb picks up to formulate the
basis of his concept of experience. He leaves out other, more important working
methods without proper attention.
The basic idea of the seminar followed the stages of Lewin’ s action research :
diagnosing problems, ® nding solutions to them, exercising the solutions and planning
carefully the actions to be taken ` back home ’ . The group dynamics exercises comprised
a method in the third phase of Lewin’ s action research. The re¯ ection on group
experiences played a minor role in the seminar, as can be seen in table 1 where the time
Table 1. Time distribution between the phases of the
problem solving process in Benne’ s and Lippit’ s groups
in the 1946 seminar (Lippit 1949: 169)
Benne Lippit
Group Group
% %
De® ning the problem and getting facts about it 26 35
Formulating action possibilities in the problem
situation
7 16
Practising human relation skills needed to
carry out problem solutions
42 24
Formulating general principles of action 3 3
Planning speci® c steps of back-home action 21 18
Group self-evaluation of its own problem
solving activity
1 4
spans for the diÚ erent parts of the seminar in the groups led by Kenneth Benne and
Ronald Lippit are presented.
The table also shows the diÚ erences between the groups. As a matter of fact, the
nature of Kolb’ s view of the ` here and now ’ immediate experience becomes visible, if we
study how it was developed in relation to the historical transition from Lewin’ s
community and action oriented seminar to the T-group movement. I can see four steps
in this evolution. These steps roughly correspond to the important developments in the
history of the T-group training and research practice (see Hirsch 1987).
(1) The shared societal object of the group is eliminated and the ` group interaction
as such ’ becomes the object of analysis
The objects of study in the 1946 seminar were the racial prejudices and social problems
in the State of Connecticut. In the T-groups, this kind of societal, ` outside ’ object was
replaced by the re¯ ection of the interaction of the group members. In the 1946 seminar,
the participants, community activists and leaders, had plenty of diverse knowledge and
experience of racial problems and of attempts and ways of trying to solve them. This
knowledge and experience was widely used in the 1946 seminar. It was, of course, not
anything like ` here and now ’ experience. It comprised accumulated knowledge of and
insight into the communities, community programmes as well as conditions and
possibilitiesof various kinds of action. The selection of onemode of action of the seminar,
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the immediate recollection and analysis of what had happened in group sessions of the
day, therefore, replaced the wide selection of working methods related to the solution of
community problems. Kolb characterized this substitution in his analysis of ` the
struggle of ` ` here and now ’ ’ and ` ` there and then ’ ’ knowledge ’ . Kolb cites Kenneth
Benne (Kolb 1984: 10) :
There resulted a competition between here-and-now happenings, which of
necessity focused on the personal, interpersonal and group levels ; and discussing
the outside case materials. This sometimes resulted in the rejection of any serious
consideration of the observer’ s report of behavioral data. More often it led
eventually to rejection of outside problems as less involving and fascinating.
The National Training Laboratories were founded in 1947 to carry on the work started
in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Hirsch shows how the feedback sessions
of the 1946 seminar were the invention that formed the basis for the development of the
T-group method (1987: 20):
The feedback data about interaction in the group provide rich learning
experiences, presenting T-groups as a new and valuable tool in training and
education.
Robert Farr presents an explanation of this substitution described above that took
place in small group research and training. The small group research at the National
Training Laboratories ± the most important centre for the development of the T-group
method ± was mainly funded by the Oæ ce of Naval Research of the United States ’
Army. The oæ ce was interested in how autonomous small groups behave in
circumstances of total isolation from the rest of the world (1996 : 153)
It was not clear at the time whether these small groups would be in midget
submarines or space craft or just wintering over time in Antarctica during the
international geophysical war.
Anyhow, in this context, the regularities of behaviour of groups encapsulated in a
laboratory was relevant knowledge.
(2) The collection and analysis of the data by the researchers is replaced by the
discussion of the recollections of the group members
In Lewin’ s laboratory, the study of group behaviour was based on the data collected by
the researchers. In each group, there was an observer who wrote down her observations
on a form designed by Lewin’ s research group. It directed observation to the problems
that were interesting to the group such as leadership, competition, orientation to action
etc. The systematic and coordinated way of collecting data made the data comparable
and analysable. In the T-group and laboratory training, this systematic collection of
data based on hypothesis was replaced by the recollections of the participants of the
day’ s group meetings. This replacement is in a curious way visible in Kolb’ s
characterization of the relationship of the ® rst and second phases of his learning model
(1986 : 21) :
The process that begins with here-and-now experience ¼ followed by collection
of data and observations about that experience.
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If the recollections and interpretations about a group meeting by the group members
are discussed, how will it be possible to acquire further data? What does it mean to
observe the ` here and now experience ’ ? Is it the same as introspection?
(3) Individualization of experience
The 1946 seminar followed roughly the idea of action research as introduced by Lewin
(1957): de® ne the problem and make a diagnosis, draw up a total plan for solving the
problem and plan the ® rst step to implement the total plan. The versatile knowledge
and experience of the participating community leaders, the outside specialists and the
researchers of Lewin’ s group were widely used. The group planned action programmes
for solving racial problems in their respective communities. The interviews conducted
after the seminar showed that the course, indeed, gave rise to new networks of
collaboration and projects in the communities (Lippit 1949: 171).
In the T-group training individuals are supposed to learn about the interaction in-
groups, that is, develop individual ` human relations skills ’ . Accordingly, the creation of
new joint activities and new ways of working, as well as networks of collaboration, is
missing in the concept of experiential learning.
(4) The concept of experience is tied to humanistic anthropology and values
The additional qualities given to the concept of experience, such as ` personal ’ , or
` authentic ’ are based on a special social ontology and value system of humanistic
psychology and existential-phenomenological conception of man. Hence, the concept of
` immediate ’ , ` here and now ’ , having a practical and technical background, can be
given a philosophical meaning like ` existential ’ . Humanistic conceptions represent
normative and philosophical arguments for methodological individualism and the
` subjectivepersonal ’ nature of experience. The in¯ uence of these theories is notmanifest
in Kolb’ s work. It is more visible in the rhetorical value commitments than in the
learning model itself. Kolb states that humanistic values oÚ er ` new hope-® lled ideas for
the conduct of human relationshipsand themanagement of organizations ’ (Kolb 1984:
11). The humanistic and person-centred orientation grew prominent in the T-group
training movement during the 1960s (Hirsch 1987: 65± 69).
Understanding humanistic and Jungian conceptions of experience would require a
separate theory-historical analysis. Suæ ce to say, in this context, that the ` peak
experiences ’ revealing the biological true nature of man proposed by AbrahamMaslow
are religious experiences (Maslow1970). To Jung, important experiences were based on
connection to the collective unconscious, the archetypal primordial images from pagan
times or to the species-historical primitive. Also Jung saw the psychological experience
as an alternative to institutionalized religion (Jung 1933: 233):
the psyche becomes something in its own right, which cannot be dealt with
measures of the Church alone. It is for this reason that we need a psychology
founded on experience and not upon faith or the postulates of any philosophical
system.
To me, both of the approaches are, idea-historically, blends of romantic biologism and
an attempt to create a new kind of world view or lay religion. That is why they can serve
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as a speci® cally ideological ingredient in the approach of experiential learning in adult
education. To analyse the role of humanistic conceptions of experience in learning, one
should analyse in what sense these kinds of ` peak ’ or mystical experiences ± if they exist
± could be the basis for learning and re¯ ection.
The four steps characterized above in the elaboration of the concept of ` immediate
experience ’ imply a radical impoverishment of the concept of experience. This kind of
experience is based on the generalization of a very speci® c mode of action, a feedback
session, which developed into a key procedure in the T-group training ± combined with
a highly individualistic and normative humanistic-existential anthropology. The rich
variety and modes of human experience characteristic of various human activities are
replaced by a narrow and particularistic conception of experience.
The dynamics of the model of experiential learning
Kolb states that each of the phases of the model is a ` diÚ erent form of adaptation to
reality ’ or a ` learning mode ’ (Kolb et al. 1971: 28). A separate individual ability
corresponds to every phase of the model (1984: 30) :
Learners, if they are to be eÚ ective, need four diÚ erent kinds of abilities- concrete
experience abilities (CE), re¯ ective observation abilities (RO), abstract conceptualizing
abilities (AC) and active experimentation abilities (AE). That is they must be able to
involve themselves fully, openly and without bias in new experiences (CE). They
must be able to re¯ ect on and observe their experiences from many perspectives
(RO). They must be able to create concepts that integrate their observations into
logically sound theories (AC) and they must be able to use these theories to make
decisions and solve problems (AE).
In the next section I shall return to the crucial point of the model, the theoretical and
epistemological inadequacy of the concept of immediate personal experience which is
meant to form the basis of re¯ ection and of the whole model. The quotation above
expresses well the eclectic quality of the model. The phases remain separate. They do
not connect to each other in any organic or necessary way. Kolb does not present any
concept that would connect the phases to each other. Rather he collects into his model
historically and theoretically distinct ingredients. Kolb continuously speaks about
` dialectical tension ’ between experiential and conceptual. However, he resolves the
tension simply by taking both as a separate phase to his model. There is surely no
dialectics in this. Dialectical logic would show how these two are indispensably related
to each other and are determined through each other. It would look for the origin of
their interrelatedness. The separateness of the phases and corresponding ` modes of
learning ’ are also based on the fact that the model is constructed to substantiate the
validity of learning style inventory. The construction of the distinct styles makes it
necessary to postulate distinct modes of adaptation. In this way, the technological
starting point partly dictates the mode and content of the ` theoretical ’ model.
JohnDewey resolved the relationshipand tensionbetween experience and re¯ ection
by taking, as the basic point of departure, practical, material life activity. He regarded
non-re ¯ ective experience based on habits as a dominant form of experience. The
re¯ ective experience, mediated by intelligence and knowledge grows out from the
inadequacy and contradictions of the habitual experience and ways of action. For
Dewey, the basis of, and reason for re¯ ectionwas the necessity of solving problems faced
in habitual ways of action. He also shows that hypotheses generated by re¯ ection can
62 reijo miettinen
only be tested in experimental activity, which might solve the problem that elicited the
process of re¯ ection. In contrast to Kolb’ s model in Dewey’ s conception (see ® gure 3),
every phase is necessarily interconnected. It is the problems and dynamics of life activity
that are the common denominator in bothhabitual and re¯ ective experience for Dewey,
and which made him a philosophical pragmatist .
The problem of induction and theory ladenness of observations
In his summary, Kolb presents a working de® nition of learning (Kolb 1984: 38) :
Learning is a process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation of
experience.
Accordingly, the core of his model of experiential learning is ` a simple description of a
learning cycle ± how experience is translated into concepts, which in turn are used as
guides in the choice of new experiences ’ (Kolb 1976: 21). This characterization
resembles the empiricist theory of scienti® c knowledge proposed by the logical
empiricists in the 1930± 1950s. This theory was a prevailing conception of the origins of
knowledge until recently. Since then, it has been criticized in various ways in the
philosophy of science. This epistemological criticism and discussion concerning man’ s
possibility of obtaining new knowledge about the world, is the most relevant issue for
any theory of experience.
According to the empiricist theory of science, true knowledge is basedon perceptions.
With his senses an unprejudiced observer can make unbiased perceptions of reality.
These can be presented in the form of elementary observation statements; sometimes
called ` protocol ’ statements. These statements form a foundation for true knowledge.
Following the rules of formal logic, it is possible to infer laws and theories from these
statements (induction). From these laws and theories, in turn, one can infer new
propositionsand forecasts concerning reality (deduction) that can be tested empirically,
that is, to show their correspondencewith unbiased observations.AlthoughKolb speaks
about observation and re¯ ection instead of observation and induction, the basic
problems of his model remain the same.
Whereas empiricist philosophy regards observations of reality and nature as a
starting point of knowledge, Kolb postulates observation of experience as a starting
point. This resembles the method of introspection of idealist psychology in the 1800s,
which made the inner states of mind an object of observation and reporting. Experience
can be understood either as a stream of consciousness or subjective recollections of an
interaction situation (compare T-group). The experiential model replaces the naive
epistemological realism of empiricism with an individualist and subjectivist stance.
What unites the two is the con® dence in induction.
The conception of the formation of knowledge discussed above was denounced by
several prominent philosophers in the 1960s and the 1970s (see, for example, Hanson
1965). They showed that the idea of objective, unbiased observation of facts was not
tenable. They showed that observations were necessarily guided and laden by prior
conceptualizations and cultural expectations. LudwigWittgenstein in his Philosophical
Investigations describes an idea as follows (1997: 450)
it is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at.
This was called the principle of theory-ladenness . It was substantiated by the results of
comparative cultural psychology and the psychology of perception. People from
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diÚ erent cultures see the same perceptual stimulus (for example a three-dimensional
® gure) in diÚ erent ways. The picture projected on the retina does not explain the
content of observation. John Dewey formulated the cultural mediatedness of obser-
vations already in 1925 in his book Experience and Nature as follows (LW 1: 40):
Experience is already overlaid and saturatedwith the products of the re¯ ection of
past generations and by-gone ages. It is ® lled with interpretations, classi® cations,
due to sophisticated thought, which have become incorporated into what seems to
be fresh naõ $ve empirical material. It would take more wisdom than is possessed by
the wisest historical scholar to track all of these absorbed borrowings to their
original sources.
Dewey considers that one of the purposes of re¯ ection is to be conscious of the layers of
cultures weaved in the observations. They can be prejudices and carriers of the
circumstances of past time, therefore being an obstacle for sensible action in the present
circumstances. Once made visible and critically transformed by re¯ ection, they can
turn into means of enriching thought and action. In the 1990s, philosophers have
stressed that observation is not only ladenwith theory but alsomediated by instruments
and practices. A scienti® c observation, as an Australian philosopher of science Allan
Chalmers states, is a practical accomplishment. It is a result of getting a whole arsenal
of instruments to work (Chalmers 1990). It is laden with local cultural traditions and
resources (Barnes et al. 1996). Any scienti® c observation already includes an
interpretation whether the organization of observation and experimentation was
satisfactory or not.
Chalmers elucidates the principle of theory-ladennes s using the following example:
What do a philosopher and a biologist see on the screen of a microscope? Where an
experienced microscopist sees a cell dividing, a philosopher can see nothing but a
` nebulousmilky substance ’ (1990 : 42). Had a group of philosophers or adult educators
collected beside the microscope, they would not have been able to make any kind of
sensible or usable generalization. Similarly helpless would be the philosopher in the
control room of a paper machine, beside the concrete casting of a cellar, or in the
inspection of the errors of a ® rm’ s accounts. Observation necessarily takes place in a
certain activity; context or thought-community , using the concepts, instruments and
conventions historically developed in that context. They steer the observations, and
with them the observer interprets and generalizes what is seen and regarded as
problematic and important.
Philosopher Michael Polanyi characterized the communal origin and theoretical
and historicalmediatedness of observations by analysing how studentsof medicine learn
to interpret X-ray pictures (Polanyi 1964: 101). In the beginning, the students see
practically nothing in the pictures. It is only after months of practising, discussions and
analysis of hundreds of pictures together with an experienced analyst that the capability
of seeing and interpreting the pictures develops. Therefore, there is every reason to
acknowledge that concepts and hypotheses based on them precede adequate obser-
vations. Accordingly, the reinterpretation of conceptions and practices is an essential
part of reinterpretation of observations and learning. Learning can, therefore, be
regarded as a relationship between culturally appropriated conceptions, ways of action
and hypothesis and empirically new ways, deviating from previous and problematic
elements in practical activity.
In the light of our knowledge on observation and knowledge formation it is highly
unlikely that an individual could, as Kolb stated above, ` be able to involve themselves
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fully, openly and without bias in new experiences ’ let alone draw any generalizations
from such experiences. Karl Popper calls the assertion of such a possibility absurd
(1981 : 72). A student of Dewey’ s logic, Tom Burke, crystallizes Dewey’ s conception of
the issue (1994: 43) :
the problem is not only how to formulate hypotheses on the basis of given
data ¼ but how to reformulate hypotheses, based on the given data and on prior
hypotheses that suggested how and why to gather those particular data in the ® rst
place.
Dewey, therefore, asserts that hypotheses are drawn from observations , from the
hypothesis and conceptions that directed the observations and, if necessary, from the
totally new cultural resources and conceptions that are mobilized to interpret the
observation data.
A solution to this problem was proposed by the founder of pragmatism Charles
Peirce. He analysed the diÚ erence between induction and a hypothesis as forms of
logical inference (1992 } 1878). Induction leads to the recognition of a fact on the basis
of the similarity of facts. Hypothesis, instead, often suggests something that cannot be
inferred from immediate perception at all. Peirce resumes (ibid.: 194) ` Induction
classi® es, hypothesis explains ’ . Peirce calls the inference that proceeds through
hypotheses an abduction. Dewey further elaborated this logic and applied it to social
practice.
Dewey’ s naturalistic model of re¯ ective thought and action
Having presented the ` Lewinian model ’ , Kolb introduces brie¯ y, with a few sentences,
John Dewey’ s model of experiential learning (1984: 22, see ® gure 2). He states that it
Figure 2. John Dewey’ s concept of experiential learning according to Kolb (1984: 23).
is remarkably similar to the Lewinian model. According to him, Dewey studies in his
model ` how learning transforms the impulses, feelingsand desires of concrete experience
into higher-order, purposeful action ’ (op. cit. : 22). This interpretation is based on a
lengthy citation that the author has taken from Dewey’ s small book Experience and
Education (1938). This book is based on a series of lectures that Dewey gave on the state
of the school, in 1937. The quotation is the only reference to the work of Dewey in the
presentation. This fragment of text is selected because it supports the author’ s agenda.
The text from which the citation is taken deals with the problem of pupil motivation at
school. However, from the point of view of Dewey’ s general theory of experience and
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thought, it is marginal. As a matter of fact, the excerpt and Kolb’ s interpretation of it
gives a unilateral and erroneous picture of Dewey’ s theory on experience and re¯ ective
thought and action (see ® gure 3).
Figure 3. Dewey’ s model of re¯ ective thought and action.
Dewey developed the conception of experience in his works Experience and Nature
(1925) and Art as Experience (1934). His conceptions of re¯ ective thought and learning
he presented most clearly in his works on thought and logic: How We Think (1910),
Essays in Experimental Logic (1916) and Logic, Theory of Inquiry (1938). " Dewey’ s approach
is a naturalistic one. On the basis of Darwinian biological theory of evolution, it takes
the adaptation of the organism to its environment as its starting point (see Dewey 1976).
In adapting to the environment, individuals form habits± routine ways of doing things.
When these habits do not function,a problem, uncertainty and a crisis emerges and calls
for re¯ ective thought and investigation into the conditions of the situation. As in
experimental research in natural science, a hypothesis is formulated and tested in
practice.The central issue inDewey’ s conceptionof experiment is whether an authority-
bond and routineways of thinking and action can be replaced by a ` reconstructive ’ and
re¯ ective way.
Dewey makes a distinction between a primary and a secondary experience. The
primary experience is composed of material interaction with the physical and social
environment. For Dewey things are ± as he says in Experience and Nature (LW 1: 28) :
objects to be treated, used, acted upon and with, enjoyed and endured, even more
than things to be known. They are things had before they are things cognized.
The secondary experience is a re¯ ective experience that makes the environment and its
things as objects of re¯ ection and knowledge. It is the failure and uncertainty of the
primary experience that gives rise to re¯ ective thought and learning.
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The phases of re¯ ective thought and action
The phases of re¯ ective learning as de® ned by Dewey are presented in ® gure 3. In the
following, I shall brie¯ y deal with the content and signi® cance of each of the phases.
(1) The indeterminate situation: the habit does not work
Routinizedways of doing things are mostly accomplished without re¯ ection. When the
normal course of activity is disturbed, a state of uncertainty and indetermination
emerges. The starting point of the experience is not experience understood as an internal
representation or recollection of an individual but as a disturbance in the human,
material activity or in the man-environment system. Some kind of obstacle or resistance
in the situationmakes the normal ¯ ow of action diæ cult. The inhibitionof direct action
is a necessary precondition of re¯ ective thought bringing about ` hesitation and delay
that is essential to thinking ’ (LW 8: 201). Re¯ ective thought starts with studying the
conditions, resources, aids, diæ culties and obstacles of action.
(2) Intellectualization: de® ning the problem
The process of re¯ ective thought starts with an attempt to de® ne what is wrong in the
situation. The actor forms a tentative conception of the diæ culty and de® nes the
problem. The formulation of the problem already presupposes the studying of the
conditions of the situation and transformation of the problem-situation itself. Dewey
underlines the signi® cance of the problem de® nition for thought. The problem that
directs the acquisition of knowledge and further studies of the conditions of the situation
(LW 12: 112):
Without a problem, there is blind groping in the dark. The way in which the
problem is conceived decides what speci® c suggestions are entertained and which
are dismissed; what data are selected and which rejected; it is the criterion for
relevancy and irrelevancy of hypotheses and conceptual structures.
(3) Studying the conditions of the situation and formation of a working hypothesis
In the following phase the analysis and diagnosis of the conditions takes place. The
conditions include both material and social conditions and the means and resources
with which the problem is supposed to be resolved. The presupposition of the possible
solution is called a working hypothesis. A working hypothesis also can be characterized
as a guiding idea or a plan. The working hypothesis ± like the problem ± is tentative.
(4) Reasoning - in a narrower sense
Reasoning is composed of the elaboration of the meaning of ideas in relation to each
other. In reasoning, thought experiments can be done. In it the tenabilityof theworking
hypothesis can be evaluated and tested in the light of the knowledge and resources
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available for an individual or a community. These thought experiments are important
because they allow the return to the beginning again. The results of material and
practical experiments are non-recursive. The thought experiments can lead to the
reformulating of a working hypothesis.
(5) T esting the hypothesis by action
The working hypothesis is tested by trying to realize it in practice, by reconstructing the
situation or the man-environment relationship. Dewey says that only the practical
testing of the hypothesis in material activity makes it possible to draw conclusions of its
validity. That is why he calls the reasoning in the previous phase as reasoning in a
narrower sense. Proper reasoning takes place as a part of the process of testing of the
hypothesis in practice. The situation is reconstructed according to the requirements of
the hypothesis, to see whether the consequences deduced from the hypothesis become
real in practice. Thought is not armchair activity. Overt, material actions are needed.
Actions that use cultural artefacts constitutean essential part of thought (MW 10 : 328) :
Upon this view, thinking, or knowledge-getting, is far from being the armchair
thing it is often supposed to be ¼ . Hands and feet, apparatus and appliances of
all kinds are as much a part of it as changes in the brain. Since these physical
operations (including the cerebral events) and equipment’ s are a part of thinking,
thinking ismental, not because of a peculiar stuÚ which enters into it or of peculiar
non-natural activities which constitute it, but because of what physical acts and
appliances do : the distinctive purpose for which they are employed and the
distinctive results which they accomplish.
Dewey does not include the outcomes of this process as an independent phase in his
model. He, however, deals with them. The testing of the hypothesisdoes not always lead
to the con® rmation of the hypothesis. But the hypothesis makes learning possible,
because the outcome can be compared to the initial suppositions implied in the
hypothesis. This diÚ erentiates the process from bare trial and error.
What is important is Dewey’ s statement that the process has two kinds of result. The
direct, immediate outcome is that the situation becomes reconstructed in such a way
that the initial problem becomes resolved. This outcome means the increased control
over the activity. Another, indirect and intellectual outcome is the production of a
meaning that can be used as a resource in forthcoming problem situations. Dewey says
(1916 : 22± 23) :
And it may well be that this by-product, this gift of the gods, is incomparablymore
valuable for living a life than is the primary and intended result of control,
essential as that control to having a life to live.
None of the phases of Dewey’ s model of re¯ ective activity are included in Kolb’ s
model of Lewinian experiential learning. None of them is included in the model (® gure
2) that Kolb presents as Dewey’ s model of learning either. The essence of Dewey’ s
thought disappears in Kolb’ s treatment. There is no re¯ ective learning for Dewey
outside problem, hypothesis and its testing in practice. The diÚ erence becomes even
more pronounced if we look at how Dewey diÚ erentiates between non-re¯ ective and
re¯ ective experience and between empirical and theoretical thought.
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The two-edged nature of experience: empirical and theoretical
thought
Habit has a twofold meaning for Dewey. It is, on the one hand, the great ¯ ywheel of
society. It is necessary, in this society, to have stabilized ways of doing things that
function well and in a predictable way in the recurring situations of life. On the other
hand, the act of following these habits can turn into a conservative factor, an obstacle
for change and innovation. In How We T hink, in a short passage ` The meaning of
experience ’ Dewey de® nes the dual nature of experience (LW 8: 277):
The term experience may thus be interpreted with reference either to the
empirical or to the experimental attitude of mind. Experience is not a rigid and
closed thing; it is vital, and hence growing. When dominated by the past, by
custom and routine, it is often opposed to the reasonable, the thoughtful. But
experience also includes the re¯ ection that sets us free from the limiting in¯ uence
of sense, appetite, and tradition.
Experimental and theoretical thought liberates us from intellectual laziness and from
the tyranny of tradition.Dewey compares empirical and theoretical thinking in the 13th
chapter of How We Think. Empirical thinking is based on observation of regularly
occurring or coinciding things and phenomena. It does not imply hypotheses of the
causes of mechanisms. As such, empirical thinking is useful in many everyday situations.
But empirical thinking entails, according to Dewey, three obvious disadvantages (LW
8: 269± 270).
E It leads to false conclusions. Empirical experience does not contain any criteria
for evaluating which of the conclusionsmight be right and which wrong. That
makes empirical experience a veritable source of many false conceptions.
E Empirical experience is helpless in confronting and explaining change and the
emergence of the new (LW 8: 270): Empirical inference follows the grooves and
ruts that custom wears and has no track to follow when the groove disappears.
E Empirical experience is often accompanied by mental inertia and dogmatism.
Dewey is quite relentless in characterizing this feature of empirical thinking:
laziness, conformism, slave-like dependence on authority. ` Passivity, docility,
acquiescence, come to be primal intellectual virtues ’ . Scienti® c thinking is
necessary for liberating the thinker from the tyranny of habit and perception,
and this liberation is a precondition of progress (LW 8: 277):
When dominated by the past, by custom and routine, it is often opposed to the
reasonable, the thoughtful. But experience also includes the re¯ ection that sets us
free from the limiting in¯ uence of sense, appetite, and tradition. Experience may
welcome and assimilate all that the most exact and penetrating thought discovers.
Dewey presents here the fact that the testimony of experience often means seeing things
through the lens of the established and traditional, the self-evident. Therefore, ` it
follows that it would be impossible to overestimate the educational importance of
arriving at conceptions ¼ Without this conceptualization or intellectualization nothing
is gained that can be carried over to better understanding of new experiences ’ (LW 8:
238± 329).
Dewey, however, thinks that concepts and meanings are not constructed in the head
alone. They are generalizations of the interactions between humans and the entities of
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environment, in practical activity. It is the regularities of these interactions ± including
the properties of things involved ± that make the transfer of concepts from one situation
to another possible.
Hypothesis and models as plans of action
Why does Dewey not speak much about concepts in his model of re¯ ective activity,
although he underlines the signi® cance of scienti® c concepts? There are at least two
reasons for that. First, he wanted to stress that concepts are always tentative and have
the nature of the hypothesis. That is why he often uses the terms hypothesis, working
hypothesis and guiding idea instead of concept. Second, Dewey wanted to stress the
functional and practical signi® cance of concept and make a distinction from classical
idealistic theories that regarded concept as mirror image of reality, as re¯ ections of the
pregiven and eternal structures of nature (Dewey 1916: 312± 313):
From the standpoint of the idea of working hypothesis, the chief function of
philosophy is not to ® nd out what diÚ erence ready-made formulae make, if true,
but to arrive at and to clarify their meanings as programs of behaviour for modifying the
existent world. From this standpoint, the meaning as a world-formula is practical
and moral, not merely in the consequences that ¯ ow from accepting certain
conceptual content as true, but as regards that content itself.
The continuity of a situation is realized through hypotheses and conceptions as plans of
action. They are formed in one situation and are then transferred as ` programmes of
behaviour ’ to other situationsas tools of re¯ ection, analysis and anticipation.Re¯ ection
and reconstruction of the environment are inseparable. This connection between
thought, practice and the properties of things involved in actions has a profound
epistemological signi® cance. Thought is a part and an expression of the individual-
environment system. The value of thought lies in what can be accomplished by it. The
content of thought is about the interactions of the many entities of the system, not the
experience of the individual when understood as recollections of events or immediate
perceptions (Dewey MW 10: 339):
Thinking is what some of the actual existences do. They are in no sense constituted
by thinking; on the contrary, the problems of thought are set by their diæ culties
and its resources are furnished by their eæ cacies ; its acts are their doings adapted
to a distinctive end.
Dewey’ s idea of concepts as tools or plans of actions resembles Ludwig Wittgenstein ’ s
metaphor of words as tools, as well as Marx Wartofsky’ s theory of secondary artefacts.
Wittgenstein uses in his Philosophical Investigations an example of a complete simple
language game ± the interaction of a mason and his helper constructing a house.
Vocabulary is a tool kit that is instrumental in communication needed in practical
activity, the construction of the house (Wittgenstein 1997: 3). Marx Wartofsky has a
theory of diÚ erent kinds of artefacts. Ordinary material tools are primary artefacts.
Secondary artefacts, models and concepts, are generalizations of the ways of using the
primary artefacts, that is the ways of man-environment interaction in practical activity
(Wartofsky 1979: 142).
Dewey’ s conception is also a forerunner of modern practice-oriented, heterogeneous
constructivism in philosophy and sociology of science (Pickering 1992). $ It resembles
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closely the idea of Ian Hacking presented in his Representing and Intervening (1983)
according to which phenomena are constructed in a laboratory and do not exist as such
in nature. It has also many similar features with actor network theory developed by
Bruno Latour. Latour proposes that agency is distributed among humans and the non-
human artefacts in networks (Latour 1993). The non-human entities also do things,
react and contribute to the accomplishment of the aims of activity (Latour 1994).
Conclusions
We have to conclude that Kolb does not give an adequate interpretation of Dewey’ s
concept of experience and re¯ ective thought. Kolb speaks about experiential learning.
Dewey speaks about experimental thought and activity. These terms are phonetically
close.However, they are theoreticallyand epistemologically quite far apart. For Dewey,
there is no re¯ ective thought without a disturbance in the habits and ways of doing
things, without hypotheses and testing them in practice. In his thinking, experience
includes the objective forms of interaction between humans and the environment
including all the artefacts and things involved in the interaction. To Dewey, experience
is not a matter of psychological state, nor anything in the minds of individuals.
In 1949, Dewey started to write a new introduction to his main metaphysical work
Experience and Nature. In this un® nished introduction, Dewey expressed his disap-
pointment about the nondualist conception of experience ± covering the individual and
the world ± being interpreted mainly in an individual and psychological way.% Dewey
says that had he an opportunity to rewrite Experience and Nature he would give it a new
name Culture and Nature (LW 1: 361). He would use culture ` in its anthropological
sense ’ . He regarded it as philosophicallyimportant that culture comprises both artefacts
and humans in their mutual interaction. The concept of culture also covers the large
variety of human activities and practices necessary for understanding the thinking and
actions of individuals. Dewey cites Bronislaw Malinowski (LW 1: 364) : ` Culture is at
the same time psychological and collective ’ . In this late text, Dewey comes very near the
cultural psychology of the 1990s (Shweder 1990, Cole 1997) that regards the interaction
between an individual and culture as the basic unit of analysis.
It appears to me that the concept of experiential learning, in the form used by Kolb
and the adult education tradition, represents the kind of psychological reductionism
that Dewey considered a misinterpretation of his antidualist conception of experience.
This conception is based in Kolb’ s book on the model of a very particular historical
incident ± or habit: the immediate feedback in human relation training. Although this
procedurehas developed intoone of the tenets of T-group training, it is epistemologically
highly problematic and cannot be generalized as a way in which people learn and gain
understanding of the world and of their own possibilities in it. When the romantic
biological and therapeutic ideas of humanistic psychology are combined with it, a
thoroughly individualistic conception of learning emerges.
Why is this conception so popular within adult education? Why is the language it
uses set apart from the philosophical theorizing of man’ s possibilities of gaining
knowledge in the philosophy and sociology of knowledge? Perhaps the idea of
experiential learning forms an attractive package for adult educators. It combines
spontaneity, feeling, and deep individual insightswith the possibilityof rational thought
and re¯ ection. It maintains the humanistic belief in every individual’ s capacity to grow
and learn, so important for the concept of life long learning. It comprises a positive
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ideology that is evidently important for adult education. However, I fear that the price
of this package for adult education research and practice is high. Along with that
package, adult education is at risk of remaining a quasi-scienti ® c academic ® eld without
connection to the philosophical,anthropological, sociological and psychological studies
of learning and thought. Moreover, the belief in an individual’ s capabilities and his
individual experience leads us away from the analysis of cultural and social conditions
of learning that are essential to any serious enterprise of fostering change and learning
in real life.
Notes
1. In this paper, I refer mainly to the critical edition of Dewey’ s writings edited by Jo Ann Boydston,
abbreviated as : EW 5 The Early Works 1882± 1898, ® ve volumes ; MW 5 The Middle Works, 1899± 1924,
15 volumes; and LW 5 The Later Works 1925± 1953, 17 volumes. For a good presentation of Dewey’ s
conception of experience, see Art and experience, chapter three, ` Having an experience ’ (LW 10, 42± 63).
2. On the phases of re¯ ective thought and learning, see How We Think (LW 8: 199± 208) and Logic, a
Theory of Inquiry (LW 12 : 105± 122). On page 157 of Democracy and Education (1916) Dewey has concisely
presented the key characteristics of re¯ ective thought (MW 9: 157). For recent philosophical interpretations
of Dewey’ s theory of logic and thought, see Burke (1994), and Campbell (1995).
3. A philosopher of science, Sergio Sismondo, makes the distinction between three diÚ erent meanings of
constructivism : social constructivism, Neo-Kantian constructivism and heterogeneous constructivism
(Sismondo 1996). Because the material entities are an essential part involved in Dewey’ s reconstruction of the
situation,Dewey represents heterogeneous constructivism as also in actor-network theory (Latour 1993) and
cultural historical activity theory, that regards consciousness always as mediated by artefacts, tools and signs
(Vygotksy 1978).
4. ` ` ` Experience ’ ’ had become eÚ ectively identi® ed with experiencing in the sense of the psychological,
and the psychological had become established as that which is intrinsically psychical, mental, private. My
insistence that experience ’ ’ also designates what is experienced was a mere ideological thundering in the
Index for it ignored the ironical twist which made this use of ` ` experience ’ ’ strange and incomprehensible ’
(LW 1 : 362).
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